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REVERSE PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE
VEIL: A STRAIGHTFORWARD PATH TO
JUSTICE
NICHOLAS B. ALLENt
INTRODUCTION
It is textbook law that a stockholder's exercise of control over
a corporation does not create liability beyond the assets of that
corporation.' This concept of limited liability for corporations is
"deeply ingrained" in both American legal and economic
systems.' Indeed, judicial acknowledgement of a corporation as a
separate and distinct entity is a cornerstone of American
enterprise, and benefits such as encouraging shareholder
investment by limiting investor risk exposure are essential.
However, limited liability has its limits. When a corporation
is used as a shield for liability or for an illegitimate business
purpose, courts will exercise their equitable power in applying
the "equally fundamental principle" of piercing the corporate
veil.4 Piercing the corporate veil allows one to puncture the "veil"
of limited liability in order to hold a shareholder liable for the
corporation's conduct.'
Notes & Comments Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2012, St.
John's University School of Law; B.S., 2009, University of Miami.
1 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-62 (1998).
2 Id. at 61 (quoting William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from
Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1929)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
' See Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate
Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 34 (1990).
4 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62.
6 See id.; see also Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944). This principle
has remained largely unchanged for over a century of corporate jurisprudence. See,
e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. F. C. Trebein Co., 52 N.E. 834, 837 (Ohio 1898)
(Courts have confined "Itihe fiction by which an ideal legal entity is attributed to a
duly-formed incorporated company, existing separate and apart from the individuals
composing it . .. to the purposes for which it was adopted,-convenience in the
transaction of business . . .-and have repudiated it in all cases where it has been
insisted on as a protection to fraud or any other illegal transaction.").
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While exact definitions vary by state, courts will disregard
the corporate entity-or pierce the corporate veil-when it is
shown that a corporation is an "alter ego." A corporation is an
alter ego when it is used as a "mere instrumentality for the
transaction of [the shareholders'] affairs without regard to
separate and independent corporate existence."6 The "paramount
goal" of traditional veil piercing7 ("traditional piercing") is to
achieve an equitable result.' Traditional piercing jurisprudence
is well established and, despite some differences in formulation,
universally followed throughout American courts.
The practice of reverse piercing the corporate veil is less
established.' Where it is available, both corporate insiders and
outside third parties have the opportunity to reverse pierce the
corporate veil. 10  In outside reverse piercing, a third-party
creditor seeks either to recover debts owed by a corporation's
owner from the corporation itself or to recover debts owed by a
parent corporation from a subsidiary corporation." Although
several states have expressly rejected the doctrine,1 2 there is a
growing trend toward recognizing reverse piercing as a theory of
recovery.13 Even still, the approaches taken in states that have
6 Phillips v. Double B Trading Co., 893 P.2d 1357, 1362 (Colo. App. 1994).
"Traditional Piercing" involves a claim brought against the shareholders of a
corporation in their individual capacities resulting from a wrong procured by the
corporation. For more information concerning traditional piercing see infra Part I.A.
8 Connolly v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S., Inc.
(In re Phillips), 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006) (en banc).
* See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 41.70 (perm. ed. 2011).
10 When performed by an insider, it is called "inside reverse piercing." Similarly,
when performed by a third party, it is called "outside reverse piercing." This Note
focuses on outside reverse piercing; for more information in regards to both inside
and outside reverse piercing see infra Part I.B.
" See, e.g., Goya Foods, Inc. v. Unanue-Casal, 982 F. Supp. 103, 108 (D.P.R.
1997); In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 645; supra Part I.B.
" See, e.g., Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 98 (Ct.
App. 2008) (refusing to adopt reverse piercing); Acree v. McMahan, 585 S.E.2d 873,
874 (Ga. 2003) (rejecting reverse piercing); McIntyre v. Nice, No. CV-99-727, 2001
WL 1708832, at *6 (Me. May 17, 2001) (noting that the court has never recognized
reverse piercing and has stated the weight of authority is against the doctrine), rev'd
on other grounds, 786 A.2d 620 (2001); Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power &
Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990) (refusing to apply reverse piercing to
current case, without directly rejecting doctrine).
" See Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 312 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002) (noting there is "a growing recognition of the doctrine of reverse piercing of the
corporate veil").
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allowed reverse piercing are far from uniform.' The various
approaches reflect attempts to weigh the interests of the plaintiff,
innocent shareholders, and other corporate creditors.15  These
approaches are unlike traditional piercing where the shareholder
is held liable for her proactive role in creating the wrong; there,
the corporation, its creditors, and other shareholders are not
adversely affected. The conflicting interests implicated by
reverse piercing mandate that any allowance of reverse piercing
delicately balance the needs of all involved parties to adequately
protect all involved.
This Note argues that while outside reverse piercing should
not be the norm, there are instances when application of
the doctrine is the only way to ensure justice. Because of
the competing interests that reverse piercing implicates,
this Note proposes that the doctrine be permitted against both
legal and equitable owners, but only when traditional, less
intrusive remedies are insufficient. Additionally, any innocent
shareholders should be permitted a capital exemption prior to
payment of the plaintiffs claim when that claim would liquidate
the corporation's assets. Finally, dilemmas amongst creditors
should be dealt with under preexisting priority laws. Part I
discusses both traditional and outside reverse veil piercing. Part
II discusses the arguments for and against the various methods
of outside reverse piercing through a case law analysis. Finally,
Part III advances a solution that safeguards the interests of all
involved parties by first identifying the shortcomings of more
traditional remedies and then proposing a new approach.
14 Compare In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 641 (holding Colorado law requires proof
that no innocent shareholders or creditors would be prejudiced by reverse piercing),
with State v. Easton, 169 Misc. 2d 282, 287-90, 647 N.Y.S.2d 904, 908-10 (Sup. Ct.
Albany Cnty. 1995) (holding that New York only requires a showing that a
corporation is the alter ego of the individual and failure to disregard the corporate
entity would procure a fraud to plaintiff), with Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS,
999 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding Montana Law does not require a
showing of fraud to allow reverse piercing, at least in tax collection cases).
15 See In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 645; see also Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v.
Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990).
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I. OVERVIEW OF VEIL PIERCING: TRADITIONAL AND REVERSE
Because reverse piercing is a variation of traditional
piercing, Part I begins by detailing traditional piercing case law
and analyzing the various approaches before delving into reverse
piercing.
A. Traditional Veil Piercing
All corporations exist behind the "corporate veil" and are
entitled to a legal assumption that the acts of the corporation are
independent from the acts of its shareholders. This ensures that
shareholders or another corporation are exempt from liability for
the corporation's actions."6 This assumption of limited liability is
"the rule, not the exception."
Piercing the corporate veil, however, places an outer
limitation on this assumption." Veil piercing is not a separate
cause of action against a corporation, but "rather . .. an assertion
of facts and circumstances which will persuade the court to
impose the corporate obligation on its owners.""
While small differences exist between states, 20 a traditional
veil piercing claim generally requires that (1) the owners
exercised complete domination of the corporation in respect to
the transaction attacked, and (2) such domination was used to
commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff.2 1 Although some
16 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390-91 (9th ed. 2009).
17 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (quoting Anderson v.
Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)).
'a See Easton, at 288, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
19 Id. at 169 Misc. 2d at 287, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
20 For instance, California and Illinois require ownership as a prerequisite to
alter ego liability. See S.E.C. v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Trossman v. Philipsborn, 869 N.E.2d 1147, 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that to
permit reverse piercing an insider must own "all, or substantially all, of the stock").
But see Easton, 169 Misc. 2d at 289, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (holding that an equitable
owner can satisfy the domination requirement; "legal" ownership is not a
requirement).
21 See Easton, 169 Misc. 2d at 288-89, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 908-09; see also Sea-
Land Serv., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
under Illinois law there are two requirements that must be satisfied to permit veil
piercing). "[F]irst, there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual [or other corporation] no
longer exist; and second, circumstances must be such that adherence to the fiction of
separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice." Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753
F.2d 565, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1985)).
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states require that three elements be satisfied before allowing a
plaintiff to pierce the veil-the third element being a causation or
equitable results prong-the analysis is nearly identical to the
two-prong test.2 2 If a plaintiff proves these elements, the court
imposes liability on the individual because the corporation is a
mere "instrumentality" or "alter ego" of its owner.23
The first prong of piercing the corporate veil, domination, is
met when the owners use the corporate form to further their own
personal goals. 24 The control that accompanies stock ownership
and management is not enough to show domination.25 Instead,
the actions taken need to circumvent legitimate corporate
purposes, so as to make the corporation a mere "alter ego."26
States are split as to who can dominate a corporation, though
many take a liberal approach, allowing both legal and equitable
owners. 27  The vast majority of cases involving reverse piercing
implicate closely held organizations,28 not publicly traded
companies.29 This Note only addresses reverse piercing in the
context of closely held corporations.
22 See, e.g., Connolly v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the
U.S., Inc. (In re Phillips), 139 P.3d 639, 646 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (stating that
Colorado law has three elements: (1) the insider and the corporation are alter egos,
(2) that justice requires recognizing the substance of the relationship over the form
because adherence would sanction a fraud, and (3) that an equitable result be
achieved by piercing).
2 See WM. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d
131, 134 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, veil-piercing is often
referred to as the "alter ego" theory.
24 Easton, 169 Misc. 2d at 289, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
25 See Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406, 411
(Conn. 1982); see also Aoki v. Atto Corp. (In re Aoki), 323 B.R. 803, 811 (B.A.P. 1st
Cir. 2005); In re Plantation Realty Trust, 232 B.R. 279, 282 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999).
26 Easton, 169 Misc. 2d at 289, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
2 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28 A closely held corporation is generally described as "a corporation with a few
shareholders and whose corporate shares are not generally traded on a securities
market." DiPasquale v. Costas, 926 N.E.2d 682, 707 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (quoting
Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ohio 1989)).
" This is in part because most publicly traded companies adhere to corporate
formalities, thus making it difficult to satisfy the domination element of the alter
ego theory. For an example of a reverse piercing case involving a publicly traded
company see Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th
Cir. 1990). A cursory assessment would suggest that any reverse piercing action
against a publicly traded company would necessarily implicate innocent
shareholders and should accordingly fail. All subsequent references to a corporation
refer to a closely held corporation unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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While a finding that a corporation is an alter ego necessarily
depends on the facts of each case, courts have identified
certain factors that provide evidence of domination: (1) the
absence of corporate formalities; (2) inadequate capitalization;
(3) commingling funds; (4) overlap in ownership, officers,
directors, and personnel; and (5) shared address, office space, and
other similar indicia.30 A finding of domination depends on the
totality of the circumstances, so no one factor is dispositive.ax
Once domination is established, a plaintiff attempting to
pierce the veil must prove that a shareholder exercised her
domination to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff.3 2
Stated differently, a plaintiff must show that a Court's adherence
to the corporation's separate existence would further the
defendant's fraud or promote injustice. 33 This element does not
require actual fraud, complete with a showing of intent.34
Rather, plaintiffs only need to show that retention of the
corporate form would produce inequitable consequences.35
Inequitable consequences can be the violation of a statute or
other positive legal duty, a dishonest or unjust act in
contravention of a plaintiffs legal rights,6 or a manifest abuse of
the corporate form, including intent to use the corporation as a
30 See WM. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d
131, 139 (2d Cir. 1991). Additional factors include the amount of business discretion
displayed by the dominated corporation; whether related corporations deal at "arms
length;" whether corporations are treated as independent profit centers, personal
payment or guarantee of corporate debts, or guarantees by other corporations; and
whether the corporation in question had property used by an owner or another
corporation as if it were its own. See id. For other factors courts have relied on, see
Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813-15 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1962). See also Robert's Haw. Sch. Bus, Inc. v. Laupahoehoe Transp. Co., 982
P.2d 853, 870-72 (Haw. 1999).
31 See generally Fantazia Int'l Corp. v. CPL Furs N.Y., Inc., 67 A.D.3d 511, 889
N.Y.S.2d 28 (1st Dep't 2009); Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343
(D.C. 2005).
32 See State v. Easton, 169 Misc. 2d 282, 288 647 N.Y.S.2d 904, 908 (Sup. Ct.
Albany Cnty. 1995).
33 See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1991)
(citing Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569-70 (7th Cir.
1985)).
34 See Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Ethridge, 159 F. Supp. 693, 696 (D. Colo.
1958).
" See id.
36 See Fischer Inv. Capital v. Catawba Dev. Corp., 689 S.E.2d 143, 147 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009).
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shield for fraud.37 Mere inability to collect on a judgment is not
an inequitable consequence as this risk is inherent in all dealings
with a corporate entity.38
B. Reverse Piercing Generally
Whereas traditional piercing holds an individual liable for
the acts of a corporation, or a parent liable for the acts of a
subsidiary, reverse piercing imposes liability on a corporation for
the obligations of an individual shareholder, or on a subsidiary
corporation for the acts of a parent corporation. 3 9  Despite the
differences, reverse piercing initially requires the same two-
pronged analysis of domination and promotion of fraud or
injustice.40 There are two types of reverse piercing: inside4 1 and
outside-depending on the relationship of the party attempting
to pierce the corporate veil.4 2 The two types of reverse piercing
3 Walk-In Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1116, 1123 (D.
Colo. 1991) (citing Ward v. Cooper, 685 P.2d 1382, 1383 (Colo. App. 1984)).
38 Shamrock, 159 F. Supp. at 696.
3 See Connoley v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.,
Inc. (In re Phillips), 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006) (en banc).
40 See State v. Easton, 169 Misc. 2d 282, 289, 647 N.Y.S.2d 904, 909 (Sup. Ct.
Albany Cnty. 1995). For states like Colorado that require a three-pronged analysis
for traditional piercing, the same three-pronged test is carried over in reverse
piercing cases. See In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 646. For a discussion on additional
elements courts have imposed in reverse piercing cases see infra Part II.
4 Insider reverse piercing claims involve a corporate insider attempting to
pierce the corporate veil to take advantage of corporate claims that she would be
unable to bring in her individual capacity. See In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644-45. For
an example of inside piercing see Roepke v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co.,
302 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. 1981) In Roepke, the court allowed a corporate insider
to pierce the veil so that she could "stack"-redeem multiple insurance policies-six
insurance policies, instead of only receiving the benefits of only one policy. Id. The
ability to "stack" was only available to the corporation itself. Id. While not widely
accepted, several states have allowed inside reverse piercing claims. See, e.g., id.;
Earp v. Schmitz, 79 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 1948); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mackey
Wall Plaster Co., 199 P. 249, 252 (Mont. 1921). But see, e.g., Feldman v. Trs. of Beck
Indus. (In re Beck Indus.), 479 F.2d 410, 418 (2d Cir. 1973); Terry v. Yancey, 344
F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1965); Messick v. PHD Trucking Serv., Inc., 678 P.2d 791,
794-95 (Utah 1984). Those states that have rejected inside veil piercing claims have
done so because it allows a corporation's owner to "have it both ways' by limiting the
owner's liability, while allowing her to capitalize on the benefits of the corporate
form. Beck Indus., 479 F.2d at 418 (holding that a parent corporation could not
inside pierce the veil of its subsidiary, commenting that the veil "will not be
disregarded where those in control have deliberately adopted the corporate form in
order to secure its advantages"). For a more comprehensive analysis on inside
reverse piercing, see Crespi, supra note 3, at 38-55.
42 See In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644-45.
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implicate different interests and diverse policy concerns. To
permit a comprehensive analysis, this Note only addresses
outside reverse piercing,4 3 unless stated otherwise.
In an outside reverse piercing claim, the plaintiff, an
"outside" third party, seeks to pierce the corporate veil to impose
liability on the corporation in order to satisfy the debt of an
individual shareholder.4 4 The "outsider" is asserting a claim
against the corporation, not for a harm procured by the
corporation itself, but rather for the actions of an individual
shareholder.4 5 Similarly, outside reverse piercing is used to
impose liability on a subsidiary corporation for the debts of a
parent corporation,46 or to hold one controlled corporation liable
for the debts of an affiliated corporation.4 7
The concept of reverse piercing"8 first arose in the landmark
case 49  of Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain
Transportation Co., o decided by Judge Learned Hand. In
Kingston, the plaintiff, Kingston, repaired a ship owned by the
defendant Champlain's subsidiary." Champlain, not the
subsidiary, requested the repairs, and Plaintiff entered into the
agreement with Champlain.5 2 Champlain and its subsidiary
shared nearly identical boards, but both companies kept separate
identities, with decisions made independently.5 3 Following
default by Champlain, Kingston attached the boats to satisfy the
4 Outsider reverse piercing is also referred to as "'[r]everse alter ego.'" See
Acree v. McMahan, 585 S.E.2d 873, 874 (Ga. 2003) (quoting Estate of Daily v. Title
Guar. Escrow Serv., Inc. 178 B.R. 837, 845 (D. Haw. 1995)).
44 See Crespi, supra note 3, at 37.
4 See In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 645.
46 See FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 421 (5th Cir. 1980).
" Gary J. Mennitt, Reverse & Triangular Piercing of the Corporate Veil, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 20, 2000, at col. 1. This is also referred to as triangular piercing because
liability moves up from one affiliate to the dominant individual and then flows back
down to the second affiliate. Id.
4 "Reverse piercing," from here on, refers to outside reverse piercing, unless
specifically stated otherwise.
" See Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 101 (Ct.
App. 2008) ("Perhaps the oldest reverse piercing case is Kingston.").
50 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929) While Judge Hand described the facts of a typical
outside reverse pierce case, he did not use the term "reverse pierce." See id. The first
mention of the term "reverse pierce" came forty-five years later in a Georgia case.
See Kingston Dev. Co. v. Kenerly, 208 S.E.2d 118, 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
6 31 F.2d at 266.
52 See id.
53 See id.
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debt owed by Champlain.54 The trial court permitted Plaintiffs
attachment, but Judge Hand reversed. 5 In doing so, Judge Hand
greatly limited the potential scope of the reverse piercing
holding: while it may "be too much to say that a subsidiary can
never be liable for a transaction done in the name of a
parent . .. such instances, if possible at all, must be extremely
rare."56
Following Judge Hand's admonition in Kingston, courts
refused to entertain reverse piercing cases for nearly thirty
years. The doctrine finally reemerged and gained acceptance in a
marital property case, W.G. Platts, Inc. v. Platts."7 In Platts, the
plaintiff sought to impose liability on her husband's corporation
in order to satisfy her share of the assets per their divorce
decree.5' The court held the corporation was an alter ego of the
husband and permitted piercing in order to satisfy the divorce
decree.59 This opinion offered little precedential value for reverse
piercing, however, as the court relied heavily on the fact that the
ex-husband voluntarily proffered the corporation's assets for
inclusion in the decree and a subsequent avoidance of that
offering by his alter ego corporation "would be unconscionable
and a denial of justice."0
Just two years after Platts, a district court in Colorado
adopted a broad definition of reverse piercing in Shamrock Oil
& Gas v. Ethridge.6 1 There, a third-party creditor held an
unsatisfied judgment against the Defendant corporation's owner
in his individual capacity.6 2 Plaintiff attached the corporation's
main asset, an oil-drilling rig, in order to satisfy his judgment."
The court permitted this reverse piercing since the corporation
was a "mere dummy" of the individual Defendant who shifted his
assets to the corporation and habitually commingled funds."
14 See id.
" Id. at 267.
56 Id.
6 298 P.2d 1107 (Wash. 1956).
56 See id. at 1108.
6 See id. at 1109.
60 Id. at 1111.
6" 159 F. Supp. 693 (D. Colo. 1958).
62 See id. at 694-95.
63 See id. at 695.
64 Id. at 698.
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The court stressed that "[tihe abstraction of the corporate entity
should never be allowed to bar out and pervert the real and
obvious truth."6 5
Reverse piercing has met the least resistance when invoked
by the government, most commonly to obtain payment of taxes
owed by individuals. The government first attempted reverse
piercing in 1976 in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States.* The
individual was not an incorporator, director, or officer of G.M.
Leasing, but the court still permitted reverse piercing after
finding that the individual was an equitable owner. 7 Valley
Finance, Inc. v. United States furthered the acceptability of
reverse piercing by holding the government's inability to satisfy
legitimate tax debts provides a "sound basis" for reverse piercing
the corporate veil.68  Today, reverse piercing is a "well-
established theory" in federal tax cases as the IRS routinely uses
the remedy to attach assets of a corporation to satisfy debts owed
by individual shareholders."
II. MIXED REVIEWS: How COURTS HAVE APPLIED REVERSE
PIERCING AND WHY SOME HAVE REJECTED IT
Section A of Part II provides an in-depth analysis of two
different approaches courts have taken in implementing reverse
piercing.o Section B of Part II discusses the various reasons put
forth by courts in rejecting reverse piercing.
65 Id. at 696 (emphasis added). Following Shamrock, reverse piercing claims
became more frequent, albeit with mixed success. See, e.g., Olympic Capital Corp v.
Newman, 276 F. Supp. 646 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (rejecting outside reverse piercing);
Divco-Wayne Sales Fin. Corp. v. Martin Vehicle Sales, Inc., 195 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1963) (denying an outside reverse piercing claim); Cent. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
of Des Moines v. Wagener, 183 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa 1971) (allowing a third-party
creditor of an individual to reverse pierce a corporation in which he was a majority
shareholder).
' See 514. F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1975), rev'd in part on other grounds, 429 U.S.
338 (1977).
67 See id. at 939.
* 629 F.2d 162, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
69 United States v. Scherping, 187 F.3d 796, 803 (8th Cir. 1999).
o While much of what is to come does apply equally to both inside and outside
reverse piercing, not all does. See supra note 48.
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A. All in Favor ... Reasons Supporting Courts' Various
Approaches to Reverse Piercing
Courts have taken two approaches to reverse piercing. This
Note refers to the first method as the "inverse method." The
inverse method simply takes the requirements of traditional veil
piercing and applies them in the context of a reverse pierce."
The second method is the "equitable results" approach. Rather
than simply carrying over the requirements of traditional veil
piercing, the equitable results approach imposes additional
requirements to better protect the diverse interests implicated by
reverse piercing.
This Note uses a hypothetical along with case law to allow
for an "apples to apples" comparison between various theories
and remedies while highlighting the nuances of each. The
hypothetical is as follows: Lady X ("Lady") wants to form X
Corporation ("X Corp."), a wholesale health supplement
distribution company. She needs $35,000 in start up. To get the
money, she liquidates her life savings of $5,000. She convinces
her longtime friend ("Friend") and brother ("Brother") to
contribute $5,000 each. Lady also gets two separate loans from
two different banks ("Bank One" and "Bank Two"), for $10,000
each. Bank One decides to secure the loan by acquiring a UCC
Article 9 lien on X Corp's inventory; Bank Two does not secure its
loan. With her capital in hand, Lady forms X Corp., an S
corporation,7 2 and assumes the role of president. Lady does not
receive any shares in X Corp.-instead those shares are split
equally between Friend and Brother. In addition to the shares,
Friend and Brother are given positions on the Board of Directors.
Despite Friend and Brother's stake in X Corp., they receive no
dividends or disbursements, do not inquire as to the dealings of
the business, and do not attend board meetings as none are
regularly held. Lady conducts business in the name of X Corp.,
which has several monthly retail customers. Lady purchases a
7 Reverse piercing does necessitate some slight alterations to the traditional
veil piercing methodology. See infra Part II.A.1.
72 An S-Corporation is a regular corporation that has between one and one
hundred shareholders and passes through net income or losses to shareholders
to be taxed as dividends paid to the shareholders. See William Perez, What Is
an S Corporation?: Definition & Requirements, ABOuT.coM, available at http://
taxes.about.com/od/scorporations/qt/scorp-criteria.htm. There are additional
limitations placed on who the shareholders of an S Corporation can be. See infra
note 167 and accompanying text.
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new car and condominium in the X Corp.'s name, though they are
solely for her personal use. She also uses X Corp.'s revenue to
pay all of her personal expenses. Despite her work for X Corp.,
Lady takes no salary. Judgment Creditor ("JC"), after finding
Lady to be insolvent, attempts to satisfy his $150,000 judgment-
stemming from a tort claim against Lady-by securing assets
from X Corp. X Corp. has $3,000 in inventory, the condominium
and car Lady purchased, two computers worth $4,000 each, and
$1,500 in a bank account.73
1. The "Inverse Method" of Reverse Piercing
The inverse method of reverse piercing has been, by far, the
most widely accepted approach to reverse piercing, with at least
ten states utilizing the same test for both traditional and reverse
veil piercing.74 This approach permits recovery in a wide variety
of cases because of its limited analysis into interests outside of
the plaintiffs; when applied to the Lady X hypothetical, this
method permits JC to recover on his claim.
Behind the inverse method of reverse piercing is the view
that, despite the different corporate interests implicated, the
remedy is a logical extension of traditional veil piercing because
the underlying equitable goals remain unchanged.7 ' These cases
n All subsequent applications of the "Lady X hypothetical" will assume that the
domination and fraud or injustice requirement have been satisfied to highlight
the impact subsequent conditions, or a lack thereof, have on the interests of
shareholders, corporate creditors, and the judgment creditor.
" While not exhaustive, states that have adopted the inverse method of piercing
include Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Nevada, New York, Oregon,
Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin. See Bollore S.A. v. Import Warehouse, Inc., 448 F.3d
317 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240 (5th
Cir. 1990)); C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P'ship, 140 F. Supp. 2d 628 (E.D. Va.
2001) (citing Greenberg v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 266 (Va. 1988) (rejecting
reverse piercing not because Virginia law precluded the remedy but only because
Plaintiff failed to show corporation was in fact an alter ego of individual debtor));
Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp., v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Minich
v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 591 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1979); Crum v. Krol, 425 N.E.2d
1081 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Cent. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Des Moines v. Wagener,
183 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa 1971); Nutrition Rich Prods. v. Nutritional Res., Inc., No. 99-
CI-00483, 2003 WL 1339309 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2003); LFC Mktg. Grp., Inc. v.
Loomis, 8 P.3d 841 (Nev. 2000); New York v. Easton, 169 Misc. 2d 282, 647 N.Y.S.2d
904 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 1995); Amfac Foods, Inc., v. Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp.,
654 P.2d 1092 (Or. 1982); Am. Petrol. Exch., Inc. v. Lord, 399 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966); Olen v. Phelps, 546 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
" See Postal Instant Press v. Kaswa Corp., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 104-05 (Ct. App.
2008).
[Vol. 85:11471158
A STRAIGHTFORWARD PATH TO JUSTICE
place emphasis on the function of the corporation, rather than
the form. In accepting reverse piercing, a Connecticut court
stressed "the need for [courts] to 'avoid an over-rigid
preoccupation with questions of structure . . . and apply the
preexisting and overarching principle that liability is imposed to
reach an equitable result.' "" The status as a separate entity
granted to corporations was introduced to subserve the ends of
justice, not subvert them. These arguments all stand for the
proposition that in the event of potential misuse the courts will
flex their equitable powers by circumventing limited liability,
from either direction, by viewing a corporation as nothing more
than a collection of individuals.
Equitable similarities aside, there are some differences that
have precluded courts from simply copying the traditional veil
piercing test for reverse piercing. The biggest difference
is the definition of "domination." As discussed above,
"domination" requires an exercise of control to such an extent
that the corporation or subsidiary has become a mere "alter ego"
or "instrumentality" for the controlling party or corporation. 9
Applied to reverse piercing, this would impose on a plaintiff the
seemingly impossible task of showing that a corporation
dominated an individual or that a subsidiary dominated its
parent corporation.80  To avoid imposing this insurmountable
burden on plaintiffs, courts have adopted a lesser standard of
control based on the same factors considered in traditional
piercing cases. 1
Certain factors relevant in analyzing traditional piercing,
while often cited, should also be reconsidered when assessing
whether a corporation is an alter ego for reverse veil piercing
purposes. One such example is that of undercapitalization. In
traditional veil piercing, alter ego corporations often operate
with insufficient assets, precluding a judgment creditor
76 Litchfield, 799 A.2d at 312 (quoting LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110,
119 (2d Cir. 1997)).
" Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Ethridge, 159 F. Supp 693, 697 (D. Colo. 1958).
7 See infra Part II.A.2 for an alternative view on how to deal with domination
in a reverse piercing context.
7 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
80 See FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[Tlhere
is factually no way that the subsidiary can interpose itself in the conduct of the
parent's affairs.").
8' See id.
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from satisfying a judgment against the corporation. In reverse
piercing, it is more than likely that a third-party creditor is
alleging that an individual is incapable of satisfying a debt
because she has divested all her assets into a corporate alter ego.
Thus, overcapitalization of a corporate alter ego could provide
evidence of fraud and serve as a basis for reverse piercing the
corporate veil.82
To better understand the implications of the inverse method
of reverse piercing, consider it in light of the Lady X hypothetical.
To show domination, JC would point to the level of control Lady
exerted over X Corp., including the intermingling of corporate
and personal funds, sharing her personal and business address,
lack of corporate formalities, and overcapitalization. JC would
argue that by divesting her assets to, and purchasing assets
with, X Corp., Lady has sheltered her assets in the corporation,
rendering herself judgment-proof. Under the inverse method,
satisfaction of those two elements would entitle JC to a judgment
against X Corp. The court would disregard the potential claims
of the innocent shareholders, Brother and Friend, and Bank
Two,83 because if Lady "was not deterred by the fact that [she]
did not hold all of the stock ... why should [her] creditors be?"8 4
2. The "Equitable Results" Approach8 5
The Colorado Supreme Court directly confronted the
common criticisms of reverse piercing" and acknowledged that
when "inartfully performed," reverse piercing can negatively
impact innocent third parties .8  Rather than use the doctrinal
shortcomings as support for an outright rejection of the doctrine,
however, the court tried to craft a remedy that could protect the
interests of judgment creditors, innocent shareholders, and
" See Pac. Dev., Inc. v. United States, C.A. No. 77-0690, 1979 WL 1283, at *2
(D.D.C. Jan. 3, 1979).
8 Because Bank One secured its loan under Article 9, it would have priority
over Lady's claim even under this approach.
* Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 521-22 (7th Cir. 1991).
8 This Note will refer to the three-pronged approach taken by the Colorado
Supreme Court in In re Phillips as the "equitable results" approach because it is the
third element, an equitable results condition, which distinguishes the method of
reverse piercing from the inverse method.
86 For a detailed discussion of the criticisms of reverse piercing see infra Part
II.B.
8 Connolly v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S., Inc.
(In re Phillips), 139 P.3d 639, 645 (Colo. 2006) (en banc).
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corporate creditors alike. The reality of their effort swung the
pendulum too far in the opposite direction.88 The shortcomings
of the equitable results approach-as interpreted through
subsequent case law-make it ill suited to deal with the factual
situations presented in many reverse piercing cases. The Lady X
hypothetical reaffirms that assertion, as this method would
prevent JC from recovering. This Subsection first analyzes the
additional factor imposed by this method and then surveys
subsequent case law to better define the conditions it imposes,
before ultimately applying this approach to the Lady X
hypothetical.
In addition to the requirements of domination and a showing
of fraud or injustice, Colorado requires that "an equitable
result [be] achieved by piercing."" The court defined "equitable
result[s]" to mean that neither innocent shareholders nor
corporate creditors would be prejudiced by allowing reverse
piercing.o This requires an analysis to assess the availability of
other, less intrusive remedies, and discourages reverse piercing
when such remedies are viable alternatives.9 1 In Phillips v.
Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.,
Inc., the court found that because the shareholder's personal
creditors were identical to the corporation's creditors, no harm
would come to the creditors by reverse piercing.92 Similarly,
reverse piercing did not injure innocent shareholders, as the
individual Defendant owned the corporation outright.93 The
court left further decisions to determine whether any injury, no
matter how minute, to creditors or shareholders would be
sufficient to overrule a reverse piercing claim.
Since Phillips, there have been just four reverse piercing
cases in Colorado. These cases have failed to contribute objective
methodology to the lip service Phillips paid to equitable results.
The subsequent cases forego the in-depth analysis necessary to
" As the subsequent application will reveal, JC would be unable to recover from
Lady X under this method.
89 See In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 641. The requirement that an equitable result
be achieved also exists in traditional veil piercing cases, though Courts routinely
incorporated this requirement into the second prong, which requires a showing of
fraud or injustice.
8 See id. at 646.
91 See id. at 647.
2 See id. at 646.
* See id.
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obtain "equitable results," opting instead for a mechanical
application of the elements.9 4 The first case, Stimpson v.
Goldberg,9' misinterpreted the third prong of the reverse piercing
test, finding the defendant's ability to move assets beyond the
plaintiffs reach "manifestly inequitable and unfair" in
satisfaction of the third prong.96  Two years later in GRY
Partners LLP v. Tabernash Meadows Water & Sanitation
District," the court, in authorizing reverse piercing, noted that
the limited liability partnership had no creditors and the only
other partner was the individual Defendant's wife, who
contributed no capital to the partnership." This holding begged
the question of whether a capital investment would have
prevented Plaintiff from reverse piercing the corporation.
The last of the Phillips progeny, Shem, LLC v. Buhler,9
provides an answer to the question posed by GRY Partners.'00
Here, the plaintiff attempted to reverse pierce all the
corporations in which the individual Defendant was involved, but
succeeded only on those that the Defendant wholly owned.'o The
depthless analysis proffered by the court in these cases falls far
short of that required to ensure equitable results.
Using the equitable results approach, JC would not be able
to recover against Lady-as he did under the inverse method. As
a preliminary matter, there is a split as to whether Lady-an
equitable owner-can be found to have dominated X Corp.,
though Shem seems to mandate that she cannot. The fact that
she does not own any shares would prevent a finding of
domination.102 Assuming, arguendo, she could, the question then
9 In the most recent case, Carreras v. Lemon, No. 07-cv-00739-MSK-KMT, 2008
WL 3895527, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2008), the court dismissed Plaintiffs claim for
reverse piercing for failure to provide any factual basis as to any of the three
elements.
* No. 2004CV1563, 2006 WL 3949633 (D. Colo. Nov. 8, 2006).
96 Id. at *10.
1 No. 2006CV220, 2008 WL 5597587 (D. Colo. June 12, 2008).
98 Id. at *8.
9 No. 06 CV 687, 2008 WL 4532827 (D. Colo. June 27, 2008), affd, No.
08CA2138, 2009 WL 2810330 (Colo. App. Sept. 3, 2009).
199 See id. at *2-6.
191 See id. at *1, *5-6. The court did no further analysis as to the corporations'
involvement with or relations to the other shareholders, finding their mere existence
to be sufficient to override Plaintiffs interest in reverse piercing. Id.
102 In Shem, Plaintiff was not allowed to reverse pierce a company where the
individual Defendant owned seventy percent and the other thirty percent consisted
of various family members each with a five percent or less interest. See id.
1162 [Vol. 85:1147
A STRAIGHTFORWARD PATH TO JUSTICE
turns to whether Brother and Friend's investments would serve
as a bar to reverse piercing, a question unanswered in GRY
Partners. The court could respond to Brother's and Friend's
capital investment in one of three ways: (1) hold that their
investments serve as an absolute bar to reverse piercing,
(2) deduct the total amount of their investments from the
corporation's total assets and allow JC to recover, or (3) allow JC
to reverse pierce and ignore their investments entirely. Based on
the logic of Shem, the court would presumably choose the first
approach, barring JC from recovery since Brother and Friend
each invested in X Corp. and each owned fifty percent of X
Corp. 103
Thus, the "equitable results" approach fails to achieve just
that. By not analyzing the effects, impact and involvement of
innocent shareholders and creditors, courts give blind deference
to a corporation's form rather than its substance. They are
withholding justice from rightful plaintiffs on the chance that
others may be adversely affected. Such precautions are wholly
unnecessary as the facts of any case reveal whether such
"chance" is present. Such deference to form obviates the need for
reverse piercing by essentially precluding judgment for a
plaintiff against any well-counseled defendant who has added
shareholders to prevent such claims.
B. All Opposed ... Reasons Supporting Courts' Rejection of
Reverse Piercing
Rather than adopt either the inverse or equitable results
method, many courts simply reject reverse piercing. 0 4  These
courts cite several common objections. First, they say reverse
piercing violates normal judgment collection procedures.'
Second, courts point out the potential harm reverse piercing
10. See id.
104 States that have expressly rejected reverse piercing include California,
Georgia, and Utah. See Postal Instant Press v. Kaswa Corp., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 102
(Ct. App. 2008); Acree v. McMahan, 585 S.E.2d 873, 874 (Ga. 2003); Transamerica
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990). The
Tenth Circuit has also rejected the doctrine. See Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v.
Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting reverse piercing under Utah
law; decided before Transamerica); see also Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1298-1300
(10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting reverse piercing under Kansas law).
105 See, e.g., Cascade, 896 F.2d at 1577. For a rejection of the arguments against
veil piercing see infra Part III.A.
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could bring to both innocent shareholders and corporate
creditors.106  Third, they argue that other, more traditional,
remedies exist to provide plaintiffs with redress without
resorting to the drastic remedy of reverse piercing the corporate
veil."o' Fourth, courts refuse to lessen the "domination" standard
adopted in FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree,Is instead agreeing
with Judge Hand that "outside reverse piercing is only
appropriate in the rare case of a subsidiary dominating its
parent."1 09 Finally, several courts have expressed added disdain
for reverse piercing when the plaintiff is a voluntary, contractual
creditor as opposed to an involuntary, tort creditor. 1 0
Normal judgment collection procedures permit a judgment
creditor to attach an individual defendant's stock in a
corporation." Reverse piercing, however, allows an individual to
skip this step by levying directly against the corporation's
assets.112 If successful in a reverse piercing action, the plaintiff
would then be able to force a sale of the attached assets
belonging to the corporation.
Courts highlight the negative effects that selling off the
assets of a corporation could have. They stress the impact on
non-culpable shareholders who would witness the value, and
potentially the earning capacity of their corporation be sold off
due to the actions of one individual shareholder.11 3 Additionally,
creditors who extended credit to the corporation in reliance on its
assets would be left unprotected if those assets were sold
off to satisfy a judgment unrelated to the corporation.1 14 These
arguments, taken to their extremes, lead the courts to conclude
that the unnerving prospect of losing out to an individual
shareholder's creditors will ultimately reduce the effectiveness of
corporations as a means of raising capital, through the extension
of credit."' While the equitable results approach takes account
106 See, e.g., Cascade, 896 F.2d at 1577.
107 See Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1300.
1os 632 F.2d 413, 422 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1980).
10' Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1299-1300 (citing Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake
Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929)).
no See id.
n See, e.g., Cascade, 896 F.2d at 1577.
112 See id.
113 See id.
1 See id.
"1 See Acree v. McMahan, 585 S.E.2d 873, 874-75 (Ga. 2003).
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of these interests, it was discredited by a California court as
creating requirements that "essentially eliminate the outside
reverse piercing doctrine as a practical matter.""1
Courts further contend that reverse piercing and
its associated risks are unnecessary given the availability
of alternative, more traditional, remedies.' Often-cited
alternatives include conversion, fraudulent conveyance,
respondeat superior, and conventional agency law.1 8 With such
a wide gamut of remedies already available, courts insist there is
no need to invent a new theory of liability. 119
Additionally, in relying on Judge Hand's reasoning in
Kingston, some courts claim reverse piercing is only appropriate
in the rare instance that a subsidiary corporation dominates its
parent.12 0 Agreeing with Judge Hand, they argue that the nature
of the parent-subsidiary relationship makes it nearly, if not
completely, impossible for a subsidiary to interject itself in the
affairs of a parent to the extent necessary to make the parent a
mere instrumentality or alter ego.121 Courts hold that traditional
veil piercing mandates this standard be served, and further
believe lessening the standard with the potential downsides
presented by reverse piercing would be unduly fair to a creditor
of the corporation.12 2 Indeed, Justice Hand's labeling such an
instance as this "extremely rare" seems correct. 2 3 If courts apply
this standard, most, if not all, reverse piercing claims would be
denied. 124
Lastly, several courts who have considered reverse piercing
also criticize a doctrine that would permit voluntary creditors
of an individual, or corporation, to recover from another
corporation.125  At a minimum, courts suggest a distinction
16 See Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 106 (Ct.
App. 2008).
"1 See, e.g., Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 1998).
us See, e.g., id.
"1 See id.
120 See Acree, 585 S.E.2d at 875 (citing Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake
Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929)).
121 See Kingston Dry Dock, 31 F.2d at 267.
122 See Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1299.
123 Kingston Dry Dock, 31 F.2d at 267.
124 See Crespi, supra note 3, at 68.
125 See Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir.
1990) ("[T]he analysis of corporate veil issues is different in a consensual
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between voluntary and involuntary creditors given the distinct
public policy issues each raises.126 Judge Hand articulated this
fear in Kingston writing, "[a]ll that has really happened is that
the [plaintiffJ, being dissatisfied with the credit of the company
with which [he] dealt now seeks to involve its creature." 2 7 These
courts contend that because voluntary creditors choose the
parties with whom they deal, they can take precautions
necessary to protect their interests and to permit reverse piercing
would only reward a creditor's failure to take such precautions,
at the expense of other creditors.128
III. THE NEED FOR REVERSE PIERCING: HOW A HYBRID
APPROACH CAN PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES
When "inartfully performed," the disadvantages of reverse
piercing-such as injuries to innocent shareholders and corporate
creditors-easily outweigh the benefits-allowing a judgment
creditor to recover.12 9 Failure to allow reverse piercing in certain
instances, however, essentially provides "a roadmap" to debtors
on how to avoid payment of their outstanding obligations by
crafting the outer limits of traditional remedies and placing
action outside those limits beyond the reach of judicial
intervention.130  Part III first provides a brief overview of
commonly cited alternative remedies and their shortcomings. It
then proposes an alternative balancing test for reverse piercing
that weighs the conflicting interests of all involved parties.
transaction, such as a breach of contract case, than in a nonconsensual
transaction . . . .").
126 See id.; see also Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., 730 F.2d 977, 980-84 (5th
Cir. 1984) (discussing the differences between tort and contract cases in veil piercing
context); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 112 (1985) (discussing the economic reasons for
making a tort or contract distinction when piercing the corporate veil).
127 Kingston Dry Dock, 31 F.2d at 267.
128 See Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 105 (Ct.
App. 2008); see also Cascade, 896 F.2d at 1577.
129 Connolly v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.,
Inc. (In re Phillips), 139 P.3d 639, 645 (Colo. 2006) (en banc).
120 C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P'ship, 140 F. Supp. 2d 628, 642 (E.D. Va.
2001).
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A. The Inadequacy ofAlternative Remedies
1. Fraudulent Conveyance
Courts often cite fraudulent conveyance as an adequate
alternative to reverse piercing. While it may suffice in many
situations, however, there are instances where the fraudulent
conveyance doctrine alone proves insufficient to promote justice.
The existence of a separate corporate entity can allow a debtor to
circumvent the transfer requirement by utilizing corporate assets
as a personal piggybank instead of transferring personal assets
to the corporation, thus making it hard to prove fraudulent
intent. Employment of fraudulent conveyance to the Lady X
hypothetical brings this shortcoming to the forefront as
fraudulent conveyance proves useless to JC.13' This Subsection
discusses the scope and requirements of fraudulent transfer law,
before applying it to the Lady X hypothetical. The remedy is
then applied to Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. to show
that, despite the court's assertion to the contrary, the fraudulent
conveyance doctrine did not serve as an adequate alternative to
reverse piercing.
Fraudulent conveyance law has remained largely
unchanged 32 for five hundred years133 and entitles creditors to
avoid transfers made either "(1) with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer or obligation" when other conditions 13 4 are met.135 To aid
131 For a description of the elements giving rise to fraudulent conveyance see
infra note 134 and accompanying text. See also UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRASNFER ACT
§ 4(a), 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 58 (1948).
132 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 540-41 (1994).
133 The prototypical, and most often cited, fraudulent conveyance case is Twyne's
Case, where Pierce, a debtor with a creditor's action pending, created a secret deed
gifting all his personal property to Twyne, to whom Pierce also owed money. Twyne
v. KB, [1601] 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 811-14. Following the transfer, Pierce continued to
use his property, even branding and selling the sheep he had "gifted." Id. at 811. The
court held that while the transfer as payment of the debt owed to Twyne could
ordinarily constitute valid consideration, the circumstances surrounding this
transfer made it fraudulent. Id. at 812-13.
134 The other conditions require that the debtor either "(i) was engaged or was
about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the
debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he [or she]
would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they became due." UNIF.
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in determining "actual intent," the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act ("UFTA") includes eleven "badges of fraud."136 The UFTA
created a four year statute of limitations for fraudulent
conveyance actions, although many states have either increased
or decreased this statutory period. 13 7
Even if the elements of fraudulent conveyance are satisfied,
the doctrine provides a plaintiff with very limited remedies.
The primary remedy is avoidance of the fraudulent transfer.138
Some states also permit attachment or other provisional
remedies against the asset transferred."' Additionally, a
plaintiff is entitled to the value of the asset transferred when a
FRAUDULENT TRASNFER ACT § 4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 58 (1984) (alterations in
original).
1" UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRASNFER ACT § 4(a), 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 58 (1984). The
UFTA has been adopted in forty-three states and the District of Columbia.
"6 BFP, 511 U.S. at 535, 541. The eleven badges of fraud are:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; (2) the debtor retained
possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer; (3) the
transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; (4) before the transfer was
made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened
with suit; (5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(6) the debtor absconded; (7) the debtor removed or concealed assets; (8) the
value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent
to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation
incurred; (9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; (10) the transfer
occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred;
and (11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRASNFER ACT § 4(b), 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 57-58 (1984). These
badges of fraud are not presumptions of fraud, but merely relevant evidence. See id.
at cmt. 5, 74 U.L.A. pt. 2, at 59-60.
137 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 56.29(6)(a) (West 2011) (creating a one year
statute of limitations when a judgment has already been obtained); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 213 (McKinney 2011) (establishing a six year statute of limitations for fraudulent
transfers). Federal Bankruptcy Law covers any transfers made within two years of
the filing of a petition. See 11 U.S.C § 548 (2006). Regardless of the timeframe, the
statute of limitations begins running when the claim or transfer occurs and not
when the plaintiffs claim has been reduced to judgment. See Sands v. New Age
Family P'ship, Ltd., 897 P.2d 917, 920 (Colo. App. 1995) (citing Fish v. East, 114
F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940)).
138 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRASNFER ACT § 7(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 58; see
also id. at cmt. 2, 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 59.
13' See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRASNFER ACT § 7 cmt. 2, 74 U.L.A. pt. 2, at 58.
While attachment is available, practical considerations weigh against attachment
prior to the conveyance being set aside. See Peter A. Alces & Luther M. Dorr, Jr., A
Critical Analysis of the New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV.
527, 545.
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fraudulent transferee subsequently transfers the asset.'4 0 This
right, however, is lost when the transferee, without knowledge of
the fraud, purchased the asset for fair consideration."'
Applied to the Lady X hypothetical, the doctrine of
fraudulent conveyance provides JC with little help. Under
fraudulent conveyance law, JC would not be able to seek
attachment on either the apartment or the car owned by the
corporation since those assets were acquired by the corporation,
and not transferred to it. Even though Lady uses them for
personal use, it is corporate property and JC's judgment is
against Lady. The only potential basis for a fraudulent transfer
action would be Lady's investing her life savings in the
corporation, as it is this transfer that made her insolvent. This
claim would fall under UFTA § 4(a)(1), requiring JC to show
actual intent.142 Here the only badge of fraud that could support
JC's claim would be Lady's transfer of all her personal assets-
her life savings-to an insider, Corp. X."'
Even if deemed an insider, it is equally probable-and,
arguably more likely-that this badge of fraud will be found as a
valid investment in Lady's company-her first step down
the road of entrepreneurship-and not an illegal transfer. Lady's
argument will likely succeed because the badges of fraud are only
presumptions, and her motive could easily rebut the presumption
of fraudulent intent. Furthermore, no single presumption is
dispositive, and here JC can only point to one of the eleven
badges. The only scenario that would permit Lady's investment
in X Corp. to be found a fraudulent transfer would be if the
"investment" came after she had already been sued, or had been
threatened with such a lawsuit. In that scenario, especially
given Lady's retained use of the property to pay her expenses,
140 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRASNFER ACT § 8(b), 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 178-79. The
plaintiff is also entitled to any depreciation in value of the asset while in possession
of the fraudulent transferee. See id. at § 8(c), 7A U.L.A pt. 2, at 178-79.
14 Id. at § 8(a), 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 178-79.
142 The party seeking to avoid the transfer must show there was a transfer to an
insider made with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor." UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRASNFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 58.
.43 There would also be an issue as to whether the corporation is in fact an
insider, since Lady is an equitable, not legal, owner. This analysis has been omitted
because even if X Corp. is an insider, the remedy proves inadequate.
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there would likely be enough to show actual intent to defraud
given the pending litigation. As the facts are, however, JC would
be unable to use this remedy to recover against Lady.
A look at the complicated facts of Postal Instant Pressl44
shows that even in less "prototypical" reverse piercing cases,
fraudulent conveyance alone can fall short of achieving
equitable results.145 In Kaswa, the defendant, Mr. Rangoonwala,
purchased a Postal Instant Press ("PIP") franchise from a third
party.14 6 PIP consented to the assignment and was a party to the
agreement. 147 Following the purchase, Rangoonwala and a friend
ran the franchise as general partners. 148 After several years of
operating as partners, Rangoonwala created Kaswa Corp.
("Kaswa") for the sole purpose of operating the PIP franchise.1 49
Thus, Kaswa, and not Rangoonwala, owned all the franchise
assets.15 0 Kaswa later merged with another company called The
Print Works, but maintained the name Kaswa.1"' Upon being
sued, Kaswa sold the assets to another company for fair value. 52
After obtaining a judgment against Rangoonwala for non-
payment of franchise fees, PIP attempted to levy against the
franchise assets, but learned of the transfer and sale of the
assets.53 PIP attempted to add Kaswa as a judgment debtor
under the theory of reverse piercing. 154 The court rejected PIP's
argument and refused to add Kaswa as a judgment debtor, in
part because of the availability of other remedies such as a
144 Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96 (Ct. App. 2008).
14' The facts of Kaswa also presents two additional issues: (1) harm to an
innocent shareholder and (2) a distinction between a voluntary creditor and an
involuntary creditor. While these are factors that should be considered in any
reverse piercing action, they are omitted from discussion in this Subsection, which
focuses solely on the adequacy of fraudulent conveyance as a substitute remedy for
reverse piercing. For a discussion on the rights voluntary creditors, involuntary
creditors, and innocent shareholders should have in reverse piercing actions, see
infra Part III.B.1-2, respectively.
i46 Postal Instant Press, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 98.
147 See id.
148 See id.
141 See id. at 99.
1"0 See id.
151 See id.
ii2 See id.
m See id. at 98-99.
... See id. at 100-01.
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fraudulent conveyance action.155  An analysis, however, shows
PIP would have likely been unable to recover under fraudulent
conveyance law.
One way of showing a fraudulent transfer would be to prove
actual intent to hinder or defraud a creditor. There seems to be
no problems with the initial transfer of the franchise assets
to Kaswa. The corporation was capitalized and also had the
franchise assets as collateral. It seems unlikely Rangoonwala
had fraudulent intent as he requested permission from PIP to
add Kaswa to the franchise agreement. Again, the only "badge of
fraud" that seems applicable was that the transfer was to an
insider as defined in the UFTA."66 Because these factors are only
presumptive, it is unlikely that showing just one would convince
a trier of fact of fraud.
The other way to prove a fraudulent transfer would be to
show the transfer was made without an exchange of equivalent
value if also accompanied by one of two other conditions. PIP
could likely prove this element as Rangoonwala transferred the
equipment from himself to his corporation without receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange. However, the exchange
of value may not have been required as Rangoonwala, at the
time, was the president and sole owner of Kaswa. His control of
the transferee, makes this different from an exchange to a third
party for less than reasonable value. Assuming Rangoonwala's
transfer to Kaswa did satisfy the equivalent value element, PIP
would still have to prove Rangoonwala was either (1) engaged in
or about to engage in a transaction with unreasonably small
assets in relation to that transaction or (2) that he intended to
incur debts beyond his ability to pay.'
The first option is inapplicable here because (1) even after
the transfer, Rangoonwala had sufficient assets to cover the only
transaction he was then engaged in-the Franchise Agreement-
and (2) Rangoonwala did not enter into any further transactions
in either his individual capacity or through Kaswa. The second
option is, at best, debatable when applied to these facts.
Rangoonwala could have known that following the transfer he
would fail to make franchisee payments to PIP, ultimately
"I See id. at 105.
156 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRASNFER ACT § 1(7)(i)(D), 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 14
(1984).
1"' See id. § 4(a)(2)(i)-(ii).
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resulting in his inability to pay the amounts owed, but, for nearly
three years post-transfer Rangoonwala continued to make
royalty payments. The fact that he continued to pay for so long
would make it difficult for PIP to prove this second option. PIP,
therefore, would not be able to show Rangoonwala's transfer to
Kaswa was fraudulent.
PIP would, however, be able to prove Kaswa fraudulently
transferred the franchise assets when it sold them upon learning
of PIP's action against Rangoonwala. That transfer was made
with actual intent to defraud a creditor. While PIP could not
have avoided the transfer-because the buyer purchased the
franchise assets for reasonably equivalent value-it would have
been entitled to Kaswa's proceeds from the sale of the franchise
assets. PIP's right to these proceeds would have proven useless,
however, because Kaswa could only have been held liable for
PIP's judgment against Rangoonwala if the court permitted PIP
to reverse pierce and hold Kaswa liable for that judgment. Thus,
even had PIP shown Kaswa's sale of the assets to be fraudulent
conveyance, they would still not have been able to recover the
value of the assets without reverse piercing. Accordingly, despite
the court's assertion to the contrary, the doctrine of fraudulent
conveyance did not in fact serve as an alternative remedy.
Reverse piercing offered PIP its only chance at justice.
As the Lady X hypo and Kaswa illustrate, there are
instances where fraudulent conveyance is unable to ensure just
results, namely when an individual acquires assets via a
corporation for the sole purpose of limiting personal liability.
Even in those situations where a fraudulent conveyance action
may successfully be asserted, like in Kaswa, the limited remedies
the doctrine affords can cause undue hardships on plaintiffs
while simultaneously benefitting the wrongdoing party.
Furthermore, the statute of limitations, which could serve as a
bar to recovery in fraudulent conveyance actions, would not
preclude a judgment in a reverse piercing case. In reverse
piercing, the wrong complained of-abusing the corporate form-
is ongoing; it is the continued operation of the corporation that
allows the defendant to elude liability.
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2. Bypassing Normal Judgment Collection Procedures
While attaching shares is preferable to attaching assets-
because the former only negatively implicates the liable
shareholder-the realities of most alter ego corporations make
attaching shares impracticable, if not impossible. Traditional
attachment presents four potential problems in the reverse
piercing context. First, many closely held alter ego corporations
do not issue stock. Second, even when stock is issued, valuing
these businesses is a difficult task. Third, even when valued,
many closely held corporations place limitations on the
alienability of the stock.' 5  Finally, if the individual defendant is
an equitable owner, she will not have any shares to attach. The
Lady X hypothetical illustrates several of these shortcomings.
Shares in a corporation are considered part of an individual's
assets. To satisfy one's judgment, a creditor can simply attach
the judgment debtor's shares or rights to cash distributions. 15 9
Many closely held alter ego corporations, however, never issue
stock.' In fact, limited liability companies ("LLCs") cannot
issue stock at all-issuing instead membership interests. 6 1
Furthermore, even when a closely held alter ego corporation does
issue stocks, most do not pay dividends and avoid regular
disbursements, opting instead to use the corporation's assets as a
personal piggybank.16' The absence of distributions negates any
chance of recovering moneys via successful attachment. The only
option for the plaintiff after attachment would be to sell the
shares; given the corporate abuse, even if successful this would
not net much. Such a corporate structure thus deprives plaintiffs
of "any means" of collecting on their judgments.16 3
118 A closely held alter ego corporation refers to a corporation that has already
met the two elements required to prove alter ego. See Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc.,
114 P.3d 974, 987 (Idaho 2005). Accordingly, it infers a lack of corporate formalities.
15' Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 312 n.14 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2002).
160 See Mix v. Plaza Redondo, Ltd., No. YC 023339, 2002 WL 34239685, at *4
(Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2001).
1"1 Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 1069, 1095 (1992).
162 See, e.g., Goya Foods, Inc. v. Unanue, 233 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding
that a closely held corporation was the alter ego of the judgment debtor because he
used its assets as a personal piggybank).
163 See Litchfield, 799 A.2d at 314.
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While not easy, a failure to issue stock does not preclude
attachment as courts have ways to evaluate the worth of a
closely held corporation. Valuing a company is described as a
"pseudoscience" or an "art form" because there are countless
methods used to determine worth.16 Regardless of the approach,
factors of importance include property to be valued, the business
history of the enterprise, the economic outlook of the industry,
and the earning capacity of the company."' Once a valuation is
determined, courts must then determine market value of the
stock by establishing a proper ratio between valuation factors
and the price per share that a reasonable buyer would be willing
to pay.' 6 The reality of alter ego corporations-with neglected
formalities and commingled funds-only make these calculations
more difficult. For instance, several factors, including dividends
and expenses, would commonly be non-existent or vastly skewed
because of the defendant's misuse of the corporate form. While
not impossible, accurately valuing a closely held alter ego
corporation would be a protracted process with no great
probability of an accurate outcome.
Even if a defendant's alter ego corporation did issue
stock and the corporation is accurately valued, attaching shares
still may not be a viable option. In closely held corporations,
there are often limitations on alienability. Stock ownership
limitations can be imposed by a corporation's chosen structure.
For instance, if the alter ego corporation is an S corporation,
164 Stanley J. Feldman, Business Valuation 101: The Five Myths of Valuing a
Private Business, SCORE (May 10, 2011), www.score.org/articlebusinessvaluation_
101.html. The IRS recognizes three valuation approaches: the asset-based approach,
the market approach, and the income approach-though all three need not be
mutually exclusive. See I.R.S. BUS. VALUATION GUIDELINES § 4.48.4.2.3(2) (2006).
There are, however, eight valuation methods routinely used by appraisers, investors,
and business owners. See IRVING L. BLACKMAN, VALUING YOUR PRIVATELY HELD
BUSINESS: THE ART & SCIENCE OF ESTABLISHING YOUR COMPANY'S WORTH 57 (rev.
ed. 2005). For an overview of these valuation approaches see id. at 57-64.
165 See I.R.S. BUS. VALUATION GUIDELINES §§ 4.48.4.2.2, 4.48.4.2.3. Other
factors include the book value of the stock or interest and the financial condition of
the business, the dividend-paying capacity, and the market price of stocks of
corporations in a similar line of business. See id. § 4.48.4.2.3. Valuators also need to
consider intangible property, including everything from patents and software to
customer lists and forecasts. See id.
166 See Annotation, Valuation of Closely Held Stock for Federal Estate Tax
Purposes Under § 2031(b) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.A. § 2031(b)),
and Implementing Regulations, 22 A.L.R. FED. 31, § 4 (2008).
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no other corporations or LLCs can be shareholders. Similarly,
most LLCs do not permit transfer of membership interests
absent approval from other members. 68 Owners can place
additional restrictions on alienability through the corporation's
articles of organization and bylaws."' These restrictions can
include qualifications and restrictions on the ownership of stock
subject to a right to repurchase in the event of a violation.'
Even if not an outright impediment, restrictions on alienability
also lower the stock's marketability, and consequently the
price.' 7' Alienability is crucial in a free market and restrictions
on it could cause concern to a hypothetical buyer regarding the
presence of a ready market for the corporation's stocks.'7 2
The Lady X hypothetical highlights several of the above-
mentioned weaknesses of attaching stock in reverse piercing
actions. A preliminary issue here is who actually owns the
shares; Lady is only an equitable owner, and as such, she does
not own X Corp. stock.' 3 Lady also receives no cash
distribution-be it dividends, profits, or salary-for her
involvement. She instead pays personal expenses using
corporate funds, which places the assets out of reach of
attachment. If this matter were somehow addressed, courts
would then have to attempt to value X Corp. This would involve
pouring over accounts that may have been improperly
maintained to determine the profitability of the corporation.
Each expense would need to be scrutinized given the
intermingling of funds and use of corporate assets for payment
of personal expenses. Furthermore, there may or may not be
restrictions on the alienability of X Corp.'s shares.
167 S Corporation us. C Corporation: A Comparison, BIZFILINGS, http://www.
bizfilings.com/learn/s-corporation-vs-c-corporation.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
168 LLC us. S Corp: Which Business Type Is Right for Me?, BIzFILINGS,
http://www.bizfilings.com/learn/llc-vs-s-corp.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
169 Edward D. Tarlow, Creative Succession Planning for Managing and Owning
the Family Business, FINDLAW, http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Aug/1/126127.html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
170 See id.
171 Cook v. Comm'r, 349 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 2003).
172 See Estate of Jung v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 412, 434 (1993); see also Trust Servs.
of Am., Inc. v. United States, 885 F.2d 561, 569 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding resale
restrictions may require discount to accurately value the stock).
171 For a discussion on the need for imposing liability on equitable owners, see
infra Part III.B.1.
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Accordingly, even when courts are able to move past issues
of valuation and alienability, they may run into additional
problems as traditional judgment collection procedures are
incapable of penalizing an equitable owner who uses a
corporation to judgment proof herself.
3. Agency174
Agency generally "encompasses the legal consequences of
consensual relationships."1 7' A principal, by manifesting consent
for another, the agent, to work subject to the principal's right of
control, gives the agent the "power to affect the principal's legal
relations through the agent's acts and on the principal's
behalf."76 In a reverse piercing context, this would require the
individual debtor to have been acting as an agent of the alter ego
corporation when she committed the wrong so liability could be
imputed to the corporation. While individual state laws vary
slightly, this requires a plaintiff to show that (1) the individual
was authorized by another to act for or in place of another person
or corporation and (2) the act leading to the claim occurred
within the scope of authority.1 77
While agency principles can impute liability in specific
instances, once the use of the corporate form to shelter personal
assets is acknowledged, the limitations of agency principles of
liability become clear. An individual debtor is essentially
judgment proof provided the original cause of action falls outside
the corporation's scope. Thus, in the Lady X hypothetical,
despite Lady's personal insolvency, JC would be unable to attach
the corporation's assets because JC's tort claim arose from
conduct falling outside Lady's scope of employment with X Corp.
" Courts often cite both agency and respondeat superior as alternative
remedies. However, respondeat superior is merely a specific type of agency,
employer liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY Intro. ("The common law
of agency in the United States encompasses the principle of respondeat
superior. . . ."). Accordingly, all references to agency should be read to include
respondeat superior.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See Bennett v. Reynolds, 242 S.W.3d 866, 896 (Tex. App. 2007), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 315 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. 2010).
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The the underlying conflict in Bennett v. Reynolds 7 1 proved
conducive to remedy via agency principles. There, the Supreme
Court of Texas rejected an attempt to reverse pierce the
corporate veil, choosing instead to impute liability to the
corporation by applying agency principles." 9 Plaintiff had a
longstanding feud with the individual defendant, and after
discovering Defendant auctioned off thirteen of his cattle,
Plaintiff sued both the individual Defendant and Defendant's
corporation for conversion."so The individual Defendant resided
on property owned by the Defendant corporation."' The
individual Defendant's conversion of Plaintiffs cattle also
occurred on the corporation's land.1 82 While the corporation itself
did not raise cattle, the individual Defendant did use the
corporation's land for that purpose.18 3 The individual Defendant
owned no part of the corporation-his daughters did-but the
defendant was the president and he admitted that he "[made] the
decisions" and "[ran the] ranch."'84 Plaintiff attempted to hold
the corporation liable on a reverse piercing theory.18 The court,
however, held that because the individual defendant used
corporate authority over "corpora[tel employees, using corpora[te]
materials and equipment," traditional agency principles were
sufficient to hold the corporation liable for the conversion.1 6
Many times, however, an individual defendant's actions will
not fall within the scope of corporate activity.18 7  Limiting
liability to situations involving an agency relationship assumes
that the corporate form can only be misused by the acts of its
agents-ignoring the possibility that the corporate form itself
could be used to procure a wrong by using it as a shelter for
personal assets. 8 8
178 Id.
179 See Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867, 884-85 (Tex. 2010)
180 Bennett, 242 S.W.3d at 874-75.
181 Id. at 871.
182 Id. at 872.
113 See id. at 869-70.
" See id. at 898.
11 See id. at 875-76.
186 Id. at 897 (emphasis added).
187 See, e.g., Goya Foods, Inc. v. Unanue, 233 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2000); Fischer Inv.
Capital, Inc. v. Catawba Dev. Corp., 689 S.E.2d 143 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); C.F. Trust,
Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P'ship, 111 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Va. 2001).
188 See Fischer, 689 S.E.2d at 151-52.
2011]1 1177
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
4. Conversion
Conversion is another often-cited alternative to reverse
piercing. The tort of conversion, however, has a very limited
scope and is only effective in very specific factual situations,
as will be evidenced by its inapplicability to the Lady X
hypothetical. This Subsection will first discuss the elements of
conversion, then apply it to the hypothetical before finally
applying the doctrine to a recent case to highlight the remedy's
limited scope.
Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control
over another's property that so seriously interferes with their
right to control it that the actor may be required to pay the other
the property's full value."' There are several factors considered
in determining the severity of an exercise of dominion, including
the duration and the intent to assert a right inconsistent with
the other's right of control."9 o The initial requirement, however,
for any action in conversion is that the plaintiff had a legal right
to the converted property prior to the defendant taking it.
The square peg of conversion would be inapplicable to the
"circle" of facts implicated by the Lady X hypothetical. Prior to
the tort, JC had no legal rights in any of the assets belonging to
X Corp. and, thus, would not be able to claim conversion.
Furthermore, the judgment obtained against Lady would not be
sufficient to vest JC with any legal rights in the assets of X Corp.
In the Bennett case, the plaintiffs primary cause of action
was for conversion."1 The defendant knowingly took the
plaintiffs cattle and sold them at an auction.192 Even there,
however, the tort of conversion was insufficient for Plaintiff to
recover. Conversion allowed the plaintiff to impose liability
against the defendant as an individual. The defendant, however,
was insolvent because his alter ego corporation owned all
his assets, including the farm he lived on. 1 3  Thus, absent a
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965).
o90 See id. § 222A(2). Other factors considered are the actor's good faith, the
extent and duration of the resulting interference, the harm done to the chattel, and
the inconvenience and expense caused to the other. See id.
191 Bennett v. Reynolds, 242 S.W.3d 866, 896 (Tex. App. 2007).
192 See id.
'1 See id. at 871-72, 896.
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way to attach corporate assets, the plaintiffs judgment for
conversion against the individual defendant would have been
meaningless. 194
Conversion seems ill suited to deal with the problem of
"judgment proofing" by use of the corporate form to hide assets.
While cases like Bennett and Postal Instant Press could provide a
basis for conversion, most reverse piercing cases involve
corporations sheltering the defendant's personal assets, as
opposed to assets belonging to the plaintiff. Furthermore,
Bennett and Postal Instant Press highlight the futility in
permitting a judgment against an insolvent defendant. Even if
successful, a plaintiff could be left sitting with an unsatisfied
judgment while the wrongdoer is free to continue living off the
funds hidden in an alter ego corporation.
B. Reverse Piercing: A New Approach
It is the task of the court "to do justice to each litigant."' As
Section A of Part III illustrates, there are instances where,
despite blatant misuse of the corporate form, justice dies on the
doorstep of the court. 96  In the name of judicial convenience,
courts have adopted overly simplistic standards that overlook the
interests of involved parties, or strict requirements, if any
at all, that again fail to do justice to each litigant. Courts can
safeguard the interests of all parties at the expense of none by
(1) requiring plaintiff to show the inadequacy of other remedies,
(2) permitting recovery against equitable owners, (3) permitting
a capital exemption for innocent shareholders, and (4) applying
preexisting creditor-priority laws.
"s In this case, the court applied agency principals because Defendant's
business involved cattle raising. See id. at 896. However, had Defendant been
involved in a different line of business, the only means by which Plaintiff could have
satisfied his judgment would have been through reverse piercing of the corporate
veil.
195 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969).
196 See infra Part III.A.
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1. Ownership Requirement Versus "Domination"
Ownership as a prerequisite to reverse piercing is easily
circumvented, facilitating the practice of "judgment-proofing."19 7
One would be able to shirk responsibility merely by including
alternate shareholders in the corporate charter; indeed, that is
exactly what many judgment debtors have done."' The sole
protection afforded by requiring ownership is that it ensures no
innocent shareholders will be adversely affected by a decision to
reverse pierce. The protection of innocent shareholders, while
vital, does not necessitate that their mere existence should
preclude a plaintiff from reverse piercing. In many closely held
corporations-often the subject of reverse piercing-these other
shareholders are family and friends who receive no compensation
and are not even able to explain their responsibilities within the
corporation.199 This protection of innocent shareholders, while
necessary, can be achieved by much less restrictive means.200
In attempting to get around their own judicially imposed
requirement, courts have stretched the ownership requirement
beyond reason.201
To prevent inequity, all courts should apply a "domination"
standard. The disallowance of reverse piercing for a lack of legal
ownership is a denial of justice because of a mere technicality.
Additionally, mandating ownership simply permits those who
wish to escape liability to do so by having other shareholders.
Such a standard would not lower the threshold to permit
piercing. A plaintiff would still need to show that the individual
exercised control over a corporation to such an extent that the
corporation is but a mere alter ego or instrumentality. The only
"9' Judgment-proofing occurs when a creditor is unable to satisfy an actual or
potential judgment for money damages because the debtor has no property, does not
own enough property within the court's jurisdiction to satisfy the judgment, or
claims the benefit of statutorily exempt property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 921 (9th
ed. 2009).
's See, e.g., Shem, LLC v. Buhler, No. 06 CV 687, 2008 WL 4532827 [ 13 (D.
Colo. June 27, 2008) (denying Plaintiffs reverse piercing claim because individual
defendant was "not the sole owner").
'n See id.
200 For a suggested approach to protecting innocent shareholders see infra Part
III.
201 See Riddle v. Leuschner, 335 P.2d 107, 111 (Cal. 1959) (holding ownership
requirement satisfied as to individual defendant who owned one share and did not
participate in business, but not as to other individual defendant who owned no
shares but served as the manager of corporation and made all business decisions).
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difference would be that a corporation could then be reverse
pierced because of the actions of both legal and equitable owners.
This standard is currently used by many courts and prevents
injustice because it is malleable to the truth of a particular
situation, rather than emphasizing legal form over function.20 2
By applying a "domination" standard that permits reverse
piercing because of the actions of an equitable owner, courts
would no longer have to resort to nominal ownership and, more
importantly, judgment debtors could not immunize themselves
with the stroke of a pen on a stock certificate. Applied to the
Lady X hypothetical, such a standard would allow JC to reverse
pierce X Corp. for the judgment against Lady despite her lack of
legal ownership in the corporation.
2. Innocent Shareholders
Small businesses are an integral part of the national
economy203 and investment is the engine that runs small
business.2 0 4 Those looking to start up a business or to capitalize
their small business often rely on investments from friends,
family, venture capitalists, angel investors, and the like. 20 5  It
is not uncommon for these investors to require an ownership
interest, a board position, or both as a prerequisite to their
investments.2"' No remedy for reverse piercing that failed to
take the interests of the investor into account would be beneficial
to society. This Subsection proposes guidelines to first determine
202 See, e.g., Sheffield Servs. Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 720 (Colo. App.
2009) (requiring ownership "would open the door to fraud"); State v. Easton, 169
Misc. 2d 282, 289, 647 N.Y.S.2d 904, 909 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 1995).
203 Small businesses represent over ninety-nine percent of the nation's
employers and over fifty percent of its private sector employment. See OFFICE OF
ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMINISTRATION, Small Business Profile: United States
(2009), available at www.sba.gov/advo/research/profiles/09us.pdf.
204 Credit also plays a critical role in the capitalization of small businesses. For a
discussion of the importance of corporate creditors see infra Part III.
20 See OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMINISTRATION, Small
Business Research Summary (2008), available at http://archive.sba.gov/advo/
research/rs331.pdf; Startup Financing, ENTREPENUER http://www.entrepreneur.com/
money/howtoguide/article52718.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
206 See Robert C. Illig, Minority Investor Protections as Default Norms: Using
Price To Illuminate the Deal in Close Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 325
(2006); see also Angel Investors, SMALL BUS. NOTES, http://www.smallbusinessnotes.
com/financing/angelinvestors.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
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the innocence of a shareholder and then provides safeguards
for truly innocent shareholders. Finally, the proposal will be
illustrated by application to the Lady X hypothetical.
Investors who negotiate for power within a corporation are in
a position to insulate the corporation from reverse piercing
claims through adherence to corporate formalities and adequate
oversight.20 7 All stockholders in a closely held corporation, have
fiduciary duties of the "utmost good faith and loyalty," requiring
them to act in the best interests of the corporation.2 08 These
stockholders can use the power they have to ensure that the
activities that give rise to a finding of domination do not
transpire either through traditional corporate means or, if
necessary, by judicial intervention.20
Despite a member's potential breach of this fiduciary duty
leading to a reverse piercing claim, permitting a shareholder's
loss of capital in these instances could have negative effects on
investment in small companies. Given the importance of such
investments and the reality that not all investors with power will
utilize it, any exercise in reverse piercing need take adequate
measures to protect shareholders. The best way to protect the
interests of both the shareholders and plaintiffs would be to
permit a capital exemption for innocent shareholders when the
enforcement of a judgment would liquidate the alter ego
corporation. This would allow reimbursement to shareholders of
their initial investment.
To prevent fraud amongst family and close friends, the first
step is to determine whether a shareholder is innocent. A
shareholder would be innocent if they did not benefit directly
from the fraud. A shareholder benefits directly when they
207 See Illig, supra note 206 (explaining that all investors are in a position to
negotiate for power, though some investors accept lower purchase prices in exchange
for limited power).
2" Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976)
(quoting Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
2" See id. at 663; see also Smith v. Atl. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 803 n.9
(Mass. 1981) ("The majority may not exercise their corporate powers in a manner
which is clearly intended to be and is in fact inimical to the corporate interest. . . .")
(quoting J.A.C. Hetherington, The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in Close Corporations,
1972 DuKE L.J. 921, 946 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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receive some financial benefit because of the fraudulent
arrangement.2 10 Courts in their power could look to additional
factors to determine a shareholder's innocence.
Once a shareholder is deemed innocent, they would be
entitled to receive a return on his initial investment amount
prior to any disbursement to the plaintiff, ensuring the
shareholder does not sustain a loss due to reverse piercing. The
capital exemption would only be triggered when a plaintiffs
claim would drain the corporation of all its assets. While
permitting some recovery, the capital exemption, by potentially
depriving a shareholder of revenue, dividends, and
disbursements, encourages shareholders to protect themselves by
taking active roles in the oversight of the corporations in which
they invest in and by bargaining for more power to protect such
interests.
To illustrate the capital exemption theory, it will be applied
to two versions of the Lady X hypothetical.2 1 ' X Corp. only has
$1,500 in liquid assets-only one one-hundredth of the judgment
owed to JC. Thus, JC would have to attach assets belonging to X
Corp. in order to satisfy his $150,000 judgment. JC could attach
both the car and the condominium belonging to X Corp. If these
two assets totaled $170,000, JC would be able to satisfy his
judgment and X Corp. would still have all of its inventory and
equipment, plus $20,000 resulting from the sale of the assets. As
the purchase of these assets, were in and of themselves an abuse
of the corporate form, their sale would not adversely affect X
Corp., as would the sale of inventory or company equipment,
which are necessary to its continued operation.212 Furthermore,
X Corp. would still have more than enough value remaining2 13 to
210 For example, suppose a boyfriend "invests" $10,000 in his live-in girlfriend's
corporation. The girlfriend has no money of her own, but uses her corporation to pay
all their expenses. If a plaintiff attempted to reverse pierce the girlfriend's
corporation, the boyfriend would not be eligible for the capital exemption as he
prospered from the misuse of the corporation.
211 This Section will only discuss the ramifications for X Corp.'s two
shareholders, friend, and brother; for a discussion on issues concerning X Corp.
creditors see infra Part III.B.3.
212 Arguably, the sale of these assets could actually benefit the corporation
because Lady has been using corporate funds to pay for her personal expenses,
including those related to these personal items belonging to the corporation.
213 X Corp. would still have $3,000 in inventory, two computers worth $4,000,
and $21,500 in cash-including the $1,500 previously in the bank and the proceeds
from the sale.
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cover both Friend and Brother's initial $5,000 investments, to
cover the loans from Banks One and Two, and to continue with
business as usual.
Suppose, however, sale of the car and condo only totaled
$125,000 in sales. That amount would be insufficient to satisfy
JC's judgment-even after adding the remaining assets214-thus
requiring him to attach other assets belonging to the corporation.
Following sale of the assets, JC would not receive the entire
$133,500. Friend and Brother would first be entitled to a return
of their initial $5,000 investments. JC may try to argue that
Friend and Brother benefitted from the fraud because of their
relationship to Lady, but that would require a showing of some
financial gain as a result of the abuse of the corporate form, not
present on these facts. Absent such a showing, JC would not be
able to prevent Friend and Brother from recovering their initial
investments. The remaining $123,500 would be divided amongst
JC, Bank One, and Bank Two.
3. Corporate Creditors
In rejecting reverse piercing, courts cite a voluntary
judgment creditor's ability to protect itself as contributing to the
doctrine's redundancy.215 The rationale is that voluntary
creditors, by definition, have chosen to deal with the individual
defendant and thus have some ability to protect themselves.216
Thus, they argue that a distinction should be made between tort
and contract judgment creditors. While this rationale is valid,
such logic ignores the fact that all voluntary creditors have that
ability to protect themselves, be it a creditor of the individual or
of the corporation. Because not all creditors sufficiently insulate
themselves in the event of a breach, there are well-established
laws governing the rights of such creditors, and it is these laws
that should govern in reverse piercing cases. This Subsection
first discusses the various risks all creditors face and the means
214 The only remaining assets are the inventory, the bank account, and the two
computers, which, when combined, only amount to $8,500.
215 See, e.g., Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th
Cir. 1990) ("[Tlhe analysis of corporate veil issues is different in a consensual
transaction ... than in a nonconsensual transaction. . .
26 See id.
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in which such creditors can protect their interests. It will then
look to pre-existing creditor and bankruptcy laws and apply those
laws to the Lady X hypothetical.
Much is made of the chilling effect that would ensue were a
corporate creditor to be superseded by a judgment creditor, yet,
this is exactly what already happens.217 Unsecured creditors218
face a variety of risks, including those of judgment creditors of
the corporation itself and even some creditors of an individual
shareholder. 2 19  In spite of that ever-present risk, creditors
continue to lend to small businesses. Accordingly, considering
that loans to closely held corporations are made despite the
nearly infinite grounds upon which a corporation could face its
own action, it cannot then be said that the risk of judgment
against a corporation, stemming from an action against an
individual, would deter loans to closely held corporations.
Furthermore, unsecured creditors already face some risks from
reverse piercing by the IRS, as the doctrine has widespread
acceptance in federal tax cases.220
Unsecured corporate creditors also face risks should
the corporation declare bankruptcy. Debts owed to unsecured
creditors are secondary to those of secured creditors.221 It is only
after all secured debts are settled that unsecured creditors are
entitled to the corporation's remaining assets on a pro rata
basis.222 In most instances, the remaining unsecured creditors do
not receive full payment from the debtor's estate. Furthermore,
bankruptcy law exposes a creditor to the exact same risks as
reverse piercing-a corporation being held liable for the actions
of an individual shareholder-through a process known as
substantive consolidation. Substantive consolidation has been
217 See U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2010).
218 Unsecured creditors are those creditors who have not taken out a lien or
other security interest in a debtor's assets as collateral in the event of a breach. See
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 425 (9th ed. 2009). Transactions involving security
agreements are governed by U.C.C. Article 9. See generally U.C.C. § 9-101 (2011).
219 See United States v. Scherping, 187 F.3d 796, 803 (8th Cir. 1999); see also
Timothy E. Graulich, Substantive Consolidation-A Post-Modern Trend, 14 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 527, 538 n.50 (2006) (citing Douglas G. Baird, Substantive
Consolidation Today, 47 B.C. L. REV. 5, 11 (2005)).
220 See, e.g., Scherping, 187 F.3d at 803 ("[R]everse piercing is a well-established
theory in the federal tax realm.")
221 See U.C.C. § 9-317(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1) (2006).
222 11 U.S.C.A. § 726(b) (West 2011).
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described as the "federal analogue of veil-piercing."223 This
bankruptcy practice pools together the assets of multiple entities
and permits creditors to recover their ratable share from the
combined assets.2 24
The risks reverse piercing poses to corporate creditors are
not unique to that remedy. All voluntary creditors, be they of the
individual or the corporation, have the opportunity to protect
themselves from other creditors. If an individual's creditor is
able to reverse pierce, it necessarily means the corporate form is
being used to procure a fraud. To permit recovery to those
creditors dealing with the corporation who fail to protect
themselves over those who work with a fraudulent individual is
unjust. An alter ego corporation is one that has been dominated
to the extent that the corporation and the individual are
essentially one entity;225 accordingly, their creditors should all be
placed on equal footing.
Assume sale of all X Corp.'s assets, including the car and
condominium, nets $100,000. X Corp. cannot cover all of its
outstanding debts, which total $170,000. Bank One, which took
a secured interest in X Corp.'s inventory would automatically
receive the proceeds from the sale of the inventory-$3,000-
bringing the amount it is owed down to $7,000.226 Deducting
$3,000 and Brother's and Friend's capital exemptions, X Corp. is
left with $87,000 to cover $167,000 in debt. The court would
distribute the remaining funds pro rata among the three
creditors. This would result in JC receiving $78,143 towards his
claim, Bank One receiving an additional $3,647, and Bank Two
receiving $5,210. Applying preexisting creditor priority laws
ensures each creditor some return on the amount owed to it.
These laws do not disturb the expectations of creditors because
they are the very laws that govern all transactions entered into
by creditors. Those creditors, like Bank One, who take measures
to protect their interests are rewarded; Bank One received 66.5%
of its original loan back compared to the approximately 52%
received by other creditors-and had Bank One required
additional collateral as security, it could have recovered up to
the entire amount owed by X Corp.
223 See Graulich, supra note 219.
224 Id. at 528.
225 See Gorsich v. Double B Trading Co., 893 P.2d 1357, 1362 (Colo. App. 1994).
226 For simplicity, inclusion of additional factors, like interest, is omitted.
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CONCLUSION
"Fraud is infinite." 27  The law cannot rely solely on
traditional remedies or it will find itself "perpetually eluded by
new schemes" contrived by "the fertility of man's invention."228
The privilege of the corporate form need be used for "legitimate
business purposes and must not be perverted."229 By failing to
permit reverse piercing, courts bless this perversion and deprive
plaintiffs of a needed remedy, while simultaneously rewarding
wrongdoers who shield their assets through corporate misuse.
Traditional remedies are unable to combat the types of fraud that
give rise to reverse piercing claims, and failure to adopt new
remedies will lead to justice being "eluded by new schemes."2o
Courts, however, can protect the intersts of all involved parties
by permitting reverse piercing when (1) traditional remedies are
inadequate (2) against both legal and equitable owners (3) with a
capital investment exception for innocent shareholders, and
(4) relying on preexisting creditor priority rules. These factors
are not so overbearing as to enfeeble this remedy as occurred
with the "equitable results" approach. Instead, this reverse
piercing analysis provides meaningful and objective measures by
which a court can assess the implications the doctrine would
have on all parties and cater to each accordingly.
227 Letter from Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kaimes (June 30, 1759), quoted in 1
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 262 n.1 (14th ed. 1918) [hereinafter Lord Hardwicke Letter].
228 Id.
229 Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 102 (Ct. App.
2008) (emphasis added).
230 Lord Hardwicke Letter, supra note 227.
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